ARTICLES

Last week, I read with great hope the loud news headlines about French President Macron's statements at the Sorbonne University that "Europe is mortal and may die". Recent events, both in relation to the war in Ukraine and the attacks on Israel, as well as domestic political developments in the United States, make it clear to me that Europe, and here I mean both the European Union and the wider Europe, which includes the United Kingdom and Norway, needs to start thinking much more seriously about its defence capabilities and, in particular, about its ability to defend its borders militarily and its preparedness for conventional war. But, realising that the headlines are perhaps deceptive these days, I read Macron's own speech, which, however, disappointed me, at least as far as the defence section is concerned.

Macron has very rightly placed the emphasis on the need to promote European technological development, including the security aspects of the development of new technologies, the development of green technologies, European economic and border security, which are essential aspects of maintaining Europe's leading position in the global world. It is to be welcomed that the idea is finally beginning to take hold in the minds of European politicians that there is a security aspect in almost every aspect of the functioning of a country and that the free market will not solve everything. You cannot give all your production and technology to China and then be surprised that your vulnerability is increasing by the day. But all in all, it is clear that the age of globalisation is over!

But on defence, Mr Macron did not really say anything new. Although he repeated what he had said earlier about the possibility of bringing forces into Ukraine and thus reinforcing the strategic uncertainty, I would have liked to see a vision from the politicians on how Europe can be defended and with what? All that Macron mentions is the need for missile defence, the development of long-range weapons and a European intervention force, which is nothing new, and these capabilities have been aimed more at being ready to respond to unexpected events in Africa or have served as an excuse not to invest in the development of conventional capabilities. This has not been the case, as Europe has been squeezed out of Africa in recent years by China and Russia. But the French President, unfortunately, makes no mention of conventional capabilities, without which, as we are now seeing clearly in Ukraine, it is impossible to defend our borders.  

But on the whole, I think that the discussion launched by the French President on the eve of the European elections is even very positive, because it has opened up many issues that European politicians have generally been reluctant to discuss. To paraphrase Mr Macron, if Europe does not understand its strategic interests, does not strengthen its military capabilities, does not exorcise the spirit of appeasing the aggressor in Munich, does not have the political will to use its military capabilities and to react in time, Europe will die. To avoid this, a militarily strong European pillar must be created within NATO, capable of militarily defending its interests when the US is prevented from doing so for whatever reason. At the same time, the US is and must remain Europe's main strategic partner in security and defence matters, and this is not about some artificial autonomy for Europe from the US, but about increasing Europe's contribution and responsibility, both for itself and globally.   

Clearly, the national security interests of the US may differ from those of Europe, because, after all, each has a greater interest in the security of its own citizens. It is not new that the US looks to the Pacific and China as its primary security interest. Even in the period leading up to the US involvement in the Second World War, the US saw the Pacific and Japan as the main threat, and it took a very serious internal debate for the US to decide to initially engage in a war against Germany, leaving Japan as a secondary target. Even though Japan had directly attacked the US, the choice in favour of Germany was based on subjective factors such as Churchill's successful diplomacy and, of course, the European ties of many Americans (which have disappeared today and have to be reckoned with), but the most important factor was the realisation that Germany was more dangerous because it could acquire weapons of mass destruction, defeat Britain (and most probably the USSR). In the current situation, if the US develops a conflict with China in the Pacific, this will be the primary area of interest and Europe will have to deal with Russia on its own. Russia, on the other hand, is unlikely to miss such an opportunity when the US is occupied in the Pacific. 

Also, when it comes to Europe's ability or inability, there are a couple of conceptual issues that need to be understood. Firstly, can a policy of deterrence be successful and can a war be won with self-imposed limitations, knowing that the enemy will not respect even the basic conventions of war and the elementary laws of warfare? In Europe as a whole, we have accepted that we will not use anti-personnel mines, cluster munitions, existing and former school infrastructure for military purposes, respect the working hours and hours worked by military personnel, etc. It might not be appropriate here to refer to how Rome lost to the barbarians, but it is clear that the situation has changed since the time when all these restrictions were introduced. It is one thing when you have won the Cold War and it feels like a Kantian eternal peace, but it is quite the opposite when war becomes a reality. Therefore, in answer to the question I have asked, the correct answer will be one that is able to ensure the protection of society, to prevent the Buchas and the Irpines, because the main issue for society is to be safe. And here I draw parallels with the refugee crisis in Europe in 2015, when politicians failed to understand that the public's primary demand is for security, not for some assumptions. 

Secondly, do the countries of the European Union have the capacity to defend themselves against an adversary like Russia in a conventional war? All the talk so far about creating a European army has been more about 'wrapping an old present in new paper'. And today the largest conventional armies and armaments in Europe are in Poland and Finland, but not in any of the big European countries. But the Baltic States' conventional forces are superior to those of some larger countries. Which is of course positive for us, but not good overall. Here we can mention Stalin's famous question, which he allegedly asked British Prime Minister Churchill in 1944, when he called for less pressure on Catholics in the USSR - "How many divisions does the Pope have?". I think this thinking is still relevant in Russia today - how many divisions does the European Union have?

Thirdly, I think that without a change in Germany's position on defence and military issues, there can be no serious defence of Europe, but we see that Germany is still living in the Kantian perpetual peace that I have already mentioned, and does not see itself as a serious player and has not really got down to the serious business of developing its armed forces.As we have seen, it is still more important for Germany to show that it is prepared to implement dead arms control treaties, and it is clear that Russia reads these signals very well.         

Finally, does Europe have the will to use military force pre-emptively in order to prevent its fundamental interests from being infringed or to prevent war on its territory?To draw historical parallels here, the Crimean War, when Russia attacked the Ottoman Empire in 1853.  France and the British Empire joined the war on the side of the Ottomans because they were not interested in the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and, in turn, in the expansion of Russian influence, since, if victorious, Russia would threaten the British colonies, but would also most probably seek to redistribute Europe, which would upset the established balance of power.The concept of the balance of power has been current in Europe, but has been forgotten because we lived in a US-dominated world after the Cold War, and now that is changing.Maintaining the existing balance of power in Europe will be an increasingly pressing issue, because Putin has made it clear that his aim is to redivide Europe. 

All these factors show that Europe's defence capabilities are more complex than they have been presented to the public. 

These same factors are critical when thinking about our own security and defence, as well as Europe's, in the next five years and decade. The evolution of the international environment clearly shows that without serious changes in the defence policies of European countries and the creation of a strong European pillar within NATO, President Macron's words at the University of Saarbon may come true.But more importantly, these factors need to be weighed in the near term when thinking and making choices about how to support Ukraine. I will write my thoughts on that separately.